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DISCOUNTING HELD USURIOUS
WHEN EFFECTIVE RATE OF
INTEREST EXCEEDS LEGAL
MAXIMUM
Fausett & Co. v. G & P Real Estate, Inc.1
G & P Real Estate, Inc. obtained two one-year, 9%2 construction loans
from Fausett and Company to erect buildings on separate lots in Arkansas.3
Fausett loaned $42,800 on the first lot and $41,600 on the second, deducted
a 1 % service charge from each loan at closing, and advanced the balances
during the loan year." Ultimately, Fausett advanced $41,445, plus a $428
service charge, on the first lot and $41,600, including the 1% service charge,
on the second lot.5 After making one payment for interest, G & P sued to
have the loans voided as usurious claiming the actual amount of interest
charged exceeded the 10 % legal rate. 6 The trial court found for G & P, and
Fausett appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court made
two determinations. First, the court found that Fausett's 1 % service charge
constituted interest rather than a brokerage fee, 7 a finding in accord with
Arkansas precedent.8 Second, the court held that deducting the highest legal
rate of interest from the principal before disbursing it, a practice known as
1. 269 Ark. 481, 602 S.W.2d 669 (1980).
2. The maximum legal rate of interest in Arkansas is 10% per annum. ARK.
CONST. art. 19, § 13; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-602 (1979).
3. 269 Ark. at 482, 602 S.W.2d at 670.
4. Id. at 483, 602 S.W.2d at 670.
5. For a table of calculations showing the interest charged on each disburse-
ment and the interest that lawfully could be charged, see 269 Ark. at 485, 602
S.W.2d at 67 1. A thorough discussion of the complicated calculation problems in
determining usurious interest is found in Comment, Usury: Issues in Calculation, 34
ARK. L. REV. 442 (1980).
6. The effective rate of interest charged was 10.723869% on the first loan
and 10.6244% on the second. 269 Ark. at 485, 602 S.W.2d at 671 (table of
calculations).
7. Id. at 484, 602 S.W.2d at 670-71.
8. See Arkansas Sav. &Loan Ass'n v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 566
S.W.2d 128 (1978); Strickler v. State Auto Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 565, 249 S.W.2d
307 (1952). See also notes 32-35 and accompanying text infra.
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RECENT GASES
"discounting," constituted usury.9 By disallowing discounting when the ef-
fective rate exceeds the legal maximum, the court's holding is contrary to the
nearly unanimous body of English and American precedent.
Usury is the act of lending money at an excessive or unlawfully high
rate of interest. 10 By prohibiting loans at excessive interest rates," state
legislatures seek to protect borrowers who, by adverse circumstances, -must
9. 269 Ark. at484, 602 S.W.2d at 671.Seealso Vahlbergv. Keaton, 51 Ark.
534, 538, 11 S.W. 878, 878 (1889) (discount is interest in advance); Cumberland
Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tenn. 1977) (same).
Discounting also can refer to the sale of negotiable paper at less than face value.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 418 (5th ed. 1979). A note for which value has once been
given can be discounted at any rate, but the discount of paper for which no value
has been given previously will be considered interest. See Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash.
2d 268, 407 P.2d 434 (1965).
10. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1385 (5th ed. 1979). Usury is purely a crea-
tion of statutes. The states have different usury statutes imposing a variety of
penalties and allowing a variety of exemptions. In addition, many state statutes
vary the maximum interest rate according to the type of loan or credit transaction
involved. A consumer transaction is the most likely to be regulated by an interest
ceiling. For a discussion of state usury laws, see Cooper, A Study of Usury Laws in
the United States to Consider Their Affect on Mortgage Credit and Home Construction Starts:
A Proposalfor Change, 8 AM. BUS. L.J. 165, 174-80 (1970); Lowell, A Current Analysis
of the Usury Laws-A National View, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 193, 236-45 (1971).
Some states consider revolving charge accounts exempt from usury statutes while
others do not. See Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 682 (1972). See also cases cited in Whitaker
v. Spiegel, Inc., 95 Wash. 2d 408, 417-18, 623 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1981). For fur-
ther discussion of this point, see Comment, Finance Charges or Time Price Differential
in Installment Sales- Usury?, 24 MO. L. REV. 225 (1959); Usury-Consumer Credit-
Revolving ChargeAccounts Fall Under the Iowa Usury Laws, 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419
(1974); Consumer Credit- The Department Store Revolving Charge Account-Usury Resur-
rected, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1368 (1971); ConsumerLaw: Revolving ChargeAccount Rates
Held to Violate State Usury Law, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1244 (1971); Sales-Usury-
Revolving Charge Accounts: An Exemption from Usury?, 45 TuLANEL. REV. 1087 (1971);
Commercial Law-Usury and the Time-Price Differential, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 246. For
a general overview of Missouri usury laws, see Comment, Usuy-Effectiveness of
the General Usury Statutes ofMissouri-Sections 408.050 and 408.070, 26 MO. L. REV.
217 (1961).
11. The first English statute regulating the rate of interest was passed during
the reign of Henry VIII. See Bank of Newport v. Cook, 60 Ark. 288, 290-98, 30
S.W. 35, 36-38 (1895); Union Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dottenheim, 107 Ga.
606, 609, 34 S.E. 217, 219 (1899). For general discussions of the history of usury
statutes, see Special Project, Usury and the Monetary Control Act of 1980, ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 27, 61-110 (1981); Comment, Usury-Effectiveness of the General Usury Statutes
of Missouri-Sections 408.050 and 408.070, 26 Mo. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1961); Note,
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borrow money at any cost.1 2 The effect of usury laws is insignificant during
periods of low or moderate interest rates because market rates never reach
legal maximums.13 When market interest rates exceed legal limits, however,
usury limits can encourage lending institutions to divert funds from these
markets to markets that allow a higher return on loans. 14 In addition, lenders
may seek to lower loan costs by imposing more restrictive lending standards,
such as increased down payments, stiffer credit criteria, higher minimum
loan amounts, and increased loan fees or discounts.15 For example, the
Federal Housing Administration mortgage rate exceeded the maximum
allowable rate in Missouri and Mississippi in the first quarter of 1974.16 In
those states, the number of new housing starts dropped 34% from the
preceding year.17 Although an economic recession contributed to the decline,
the average drop nationally was 21 % " This suggests that usury laws in-
tensify the effects of a recession and demonstrates that lending institutions
will restrict loans rather than lend funds at an unprofitable rate. Potential
borrowers, therefore, may be unable to obtain loans because of the legisla-
tively imposed limits on interest rates.
The difficulty in determining if a transaction is usurious lies in calculating
the borrower's payment f6r the use of the money.' 9 In addition to the stated
12. Cf Pease v. Taylor, 88 Nev. 287, 291-92, 496 P.2d 757, 760-61 (1972)
(borrower's willingness to pay usurious rates irrelevant). See also Baske v. Russell,
67 Wash. 2d 268, 273, 407 P.2d 434, 437 (1965); Cooper, supra note 10, at 166-67.
13. See generally Cooper, supra note 10, at 168-69; Heath, New Developments in
Real Estate Financing, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 811,842-54 (1981); Nosari &Lewis, How
Usury Laws Affect Real Estate Development, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 30, 34-35 (1980); Note,
supra note 11, at 212-14. See also Special Project, supra note 11, at 35-60.
14. See articles cited note 13 supra.
15. See articles cited note 13 supra.




19. See generally Comment, supra note 5. Generally, courts will look at the
amount the borrower actually receives and not the face value of the note to deter-
mine if the interest rate is usurious. SeeTaylor v. Budd, 217 Cal. 262, 265, 18 P.2d
333, 334 (1933); Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal. App. 3d 779, 784-85, 100 Cal. Rptr.
462, 466 (1972); Sones v. Spiegal, 179 Neb. 838, 839, 140 N.W.2d 799, 800 (1966);
National Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Bayou Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417, 422, 403 P.2d
26, 30 (1965).
Judicial decisions have identified four elements of usury: (1) a loan or
forbearance of money or its equivalent, (2) borrower's absolute obligation to repay,
(3) exaction or reservation of greater compensation than allowed by law, and (4)
an intention to violate usury laws. See Fikes v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533
P.2d 251, 263 (Alaska 1975); Dixon v. Sharp, 276 So. 2d 817, 819 (Fla. 1973); State
ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 1973); Rathbun v.
W. T. Grant Co., 300 Minn. 223, 230, 219 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1974); Beneficial
[Vol. 47
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interest rate, courts also examine other costs assessed by the lender in mak-
ing the loan. Lending institutions commonly assess "front-end" charges
in addition to interest. These are called service charges, 20 points, 21 origina-
tion fees, 22 commitment fees, 23 negotiation or brokerage fees, 24 or closing
costs. 25 When the lender deducts a fee from the amount loaned, he reduces
Fin. Co. v. Kitson, 530 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Mo. App., St. L. 1975); Western Auto
Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1981); Rollinger v.
J.C. Penney Co., 86 S.D. 154, 158, 192 N.W.2d 699, 701 (1971); Flannery v.
Bishop, 81 Wash. 2d 696, 698, 504 P.2d 778, 779 (1972); Baske v. Russell, 67 Wash.
2d 268, 270, 407 P.2d,434, 435 (1965).
The intent required is not the conscious intent to violate the usury law, but rather
the intent to receive compensation in excess of that permitted by law. See Fikes v.
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 533 P.2d 251, 263 (Alaska 1975); Modern Pioneers
Ins. Co. v. Nandin, 103 Ariz. 125, 130, 437 P.2d 658, 663 (1968); Superior Im-
provement Co. v. Mastic Corp., 270 Ark. 471, 475, 604 S.W.2d 950, 952 (1980);
Cagle v. Boyle Mortgage Co., 261 Ark. 437, 440, 549 S.W.2d 474, 475 (1977);
Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
State ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 563 (Iowa 1973); Mon-
tana Nat'l Bankv. Kolokotrones, 167 Mont. 92, 98, 535 P.2d 1017, 1021 (1975);
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 47, 277 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1981);
Cochran v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 586 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Tex. 1979).
20. See Fausett & Co. v. G & P Real Estate, Inc., 269 Ark. 481, 483, 602
S.W.2d 669, 670 (1980); Winston v. Personal Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 580, 582, 249
S.W.2d 315, 316 (1952); Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556 S.W.2d 516,
535 (Tenn. 1977).
21. The word "point" as used in the home mortgage finance industry indicates
a fee equal to 1% of the principal. It is collected once, at the inception of the loan.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1040. See also B.F. Saul Co. v. West
End Park N., Inc., 250 Md. 707, 713, 246 A.2d 591, 595 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 271 Ark. 588, 589,
609 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1980); Turnerv. West Memphis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266
Ark. 530, 534, 588 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1979).
23. A commitment fee, common in real estate transactions, is the amount paid
by the borrower to the lender, in addition to interest, for a loan commitment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 248. See also Arkansas Say. & Loan
Ass'n, v. Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc., 263 Ark. 264, 267, 566 S.W.2d 128, 130
(1978); People v. Central Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 41,43-44,385 N.E.2d
555, 555, 412 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816 (1978); Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex. 1979); Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. 1976).
24. See, e.g., Grady v. Price, 94 Ariz. 252, 255, 383 P.2d 173, 175 (1963);
Habach v.Johnson, 132 Ark. 374, 376, 201 S.W. 286, 287 (1918); Speier v. Mon-
nah Park Block Co., 84 So. 2d 697, 698 (Fla. 1955); United Mortgage Co. v.
Hildreth, 93 Nev. 79, 81, 559 P.2d 1186, 1187 (1977); Miller v. York, 92 Nev.
226, 229, 548 P.2d 941, 943 (1976); Pease v. Taylor, 88 Nev. 287, 290, 496 P.2d
757, 759 (1972).
25. See United-Bilt Homes, Inc. v. Teague, 245 Ark. 132, 432 S.W.2d 1
(1968). For further discussion of the front-end charges assessed by lenders, see
1982]
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the principal and increases the effective interest rate. To determine if a loan
is usurious, the crucial factor is the effective rate of interest, 26 which hinges
on the amount the borrower can use during the loan. For example, a lender
might loan $1,000 at the 10 % legal maximum for one year. If he deducts
the $100 interest in advance, the borrower receives $900. The effective rate
of interest, therefore, is 11.11 %, not 10%, because the borrower is paying
$100 for the use of $900 for one year. The effective rate of interest increases
if front-end charges are found to be interest. 2
7
Loiseaux, Some Usuy Problem; in Commercial Lending, 49 TEx. L. REV. 419, 422-24
(1971); Podell, The Application of Usuiy Laws to Modern Real Estate Transactions, 1 REAL
EST. L.J. 136, 142-48 (1972).
26. In Arkansas, the term "rate" is construed to mean "effective yield."
Davidson v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 255 Ark. 127, 131, 499 S.W.2d 68,
70-71 (1973).
27. Courts have said often that they will look behind the form of a loan trans-
action to determine if charges are an attempt to circumvent the usury laws. See
Modern Pioneers Ins. Co. v. Nandin, 103 Ariz. 125, 130, 437 P.2d 658, 663 (1968);
Western Auto Supply Co. v. Vick, 303 N.C. 30, 37, 277 S.E.2d 360, 366 (1981);
Russell v. Lumberman's Mortgage Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 171, 171, 273 N.E.2d 803,
804 (C.P. 1966); Gonzales County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d
903, 906 (Tex. 1976); Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 329-30, 262 A.2d 479, 482
(1970).
Generally, courts will not consider the charges to be interest, provided they are
for services actually performed in connection with the particular loan and the charges
are reasonable. See, e.g., Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz. 59, 62, 448
P.2d 859, 862 (1968) (charges for supplying required FHA supervision and pro-'
cessing FHA applications are not interest provided charges are reasonable); Johnson
v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 271 Ark. 588, 589, 609 S.W.2d 60, 61 (1980)
(charges for photographs, appraisals, title insurance, credit reports, abstract, and
attorney were legitimate); Harris v. Guaranty Fin. Corp., 244 Ark. 218, 224, 424
S.W.2d 355, 358 (1968) (charge for title work pursuant to contract was not interest);
Klett v. Security Acceptance Co., 38 Cal. 2d 770, 788, 242 P.2d 873, 885 (1952)
(legitimate charges for specific items of actual service and expense are not interest);
Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(borrower can be charged reasonable expenses of making particular loan); D & M
Dev. Co. v. Sherwood & Roberts, Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 201,457 P.2d 439, 440 (1969)
(court found commitment fee or brokerage fee did not constitute interest); State
ex rel. Turner v. Younker Bros., 210 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Iowa 1973) (lender could
charge a reasonable fee for specific services such as title examination, recording fees,
travel and commission expenses, and credit reports); People v. Central Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 46 N.Y.2d 41, 43-44, 385 N.E.2d 555, 555, 412 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816
(1978) (commitment fee paid in consideration of lender's keeping funds in reserve
for future mortgage loans not considered interest for purpose of usury statute); Sted-
man v. Georgetown Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 595 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1979) (lender
may charge fee that commits it to make loan at future date); Gonzales County Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976) (same); Peoples Nat'l
Bank v. National Bank of Commerce, 69 Wash. 2d 682, 690-91, 420 P.2d 208, 214
(1966) (101% service charge allowed for actual services performed, including plat-
[Vol. 47
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The consequence of exceeding the legal limit is harsh in Arkansas. 28
While states impose a variety of penalties for violating usury statutes, 29 very
few states exact forfeiture of the principal as does Arkansas. 30 A violation
can occur even if the borrower pays no interest because usury occurs when
the parties execute a usurious contract. 31 If the lender contracts for more
ting area, blacktopping streets, installing drains, water supply, and fire hydrants).
When courts have considered the charges to be interest, the charges were for
services not actually performed or were an unreasonable charge for the service that
was performed. See, e.g., Turner v. West Memphis Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 266
Ark. 530, 534, 588 S.W.2d 691, 693 (1979) (1% origination fee was interest because
part of finance charge); Winston v. Personal Fin. Co., 220 Ark. 580, 587, 249
S.W.2d 315, 319 (1952) (service charge an attempt to conceal usury); Russell v.
Lumberman's Mortgage Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 171, 172, 273 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1966)
(lender performed no special services that justified discount or origination fee);
Brown v. Pilini, 128 Vt. 324, 331, 262 A.2d 479, 483 (1970) (10% handling charge
constituted interest).
Ordinarily, the charge is not retained by the lender, but is paid to third par-
ties. See, e.g., Johnson v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 271 Ark. 588, 589, 609
S.W.2d 60, 61 (1980) (money charged for services was paid to third party and was
legitimate); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033, 1035 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981) (legitimate fees usually paid to third parties).
Courts tend to view an excessive charge for an otherwise legitimate service as
a way of avoiding usury laws. Consequently, any amount above what is considered
reasonable is regarded as interest. See Altherr v. Wilshire Mortgage Corp., 104 Ariz.
59, 63, 448 P.2d 859, 863 (1968); Abramowitz v. Barnett Bank, 394 So. 2d 1033,
1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also D & M Dev. Co. v. Sherwood & Roberts,
Inc., 93 Idaho 200, 207, 457 P.2d 439, 445 (1969) (commitment fee should com-
port with going rate in community); Cumberland Capital Corp. v. Patty, 556
S.W.2d 516, 535 (Tenn. 1977) (service charges must bear reasonable relation to
expense and service of lender). In Stedman v. Georgetown Say. & Loan Ass'n, 595
S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. 1980), the court held that a bona fide commitment fee is
not interest. The court's holding disregards any inquiry into the reasonableness
of the charge. Id. at 495 (Spears, J., dissenting). Stedman is notable because the lender
repeatedly characterized the commitment fee as interest in its correspondence and
its monthly billing to the borrower. Id. at 488. For criticism of Stedman, see Usuy-
Commitment Fees- Consideration Paidjor Loan Option Is Bona Fide Commitment Fee, Not
Interest, Despite Label Attached and Amount Charged, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259 (1980);
Stedman v. Georgetown Savings & Loan Association: Reasonableness Is Not A
Characteristic Of A Bona Fide Commitment Fee, 21 SOUTH TEX. L.J. 127 (1980).
28. Both the interest and the principal are forfeited. The contract is void and
cannot be enforced. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-609 (1979).
29. The various penalties include forfeiture of the excess interest, forfeiture
of double or triple the amount of interest involved, and forfeiture of both interest
and principal. For a complete list of the state usury statutes and the penalties in-
volved, see Cooper, supra note 10, at 174-80; Lowell, supra note 10, at 236-45.
30. Only two other states require that the principal be forfeited. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37-8 (West 1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-4 (1969).
31. Hayes v. First Nat'l Bank, 25b -irk. 328, 507 S.W.2d 701 (1974).
1982]
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interest than the law allows, therefore, the Arkansas borrower can have the
entire transaction declared void and retain the principal.
Contrary to the court's first determination, Fausett claimed the 1 % ser-
vice charge was a broker's fee for procuring the loans. After G & P executed
the notes and mortgages, Fausett immediately assigned them to two separate
banks.3 2 The notes, however, listed Fausett as the payee and mortgagee on
both loans.3 3 In addition, G & P dealt only with Fausett during the transac-
tions, and there was no evidence that G & P knew of the impending
assignment. 34 Because the 1% service charge was not justified as a broker's
fee, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the charge constituted interest.
The characterization of Fausett's 1% service charge as interest was crucial
because if it were not interest, the total interest charged would have been
less than 10% .35
In making its second determination, the Fauselt court, without explana-
tion, invalidated discounting when the effective interest rate exceeds the usury
rate.3 6 This invalidation conflicts with commercial custom sanctioned by a
long line of cases and recognized in Arkansas when it adopted its present
constitution. 37 For example, in Bank of Newport v. Cook,38 which was over-
ruled by Fausett, the court allowed a lender to deduct in advance the highest
legal rate of interest on a twelve month note. Cook was reaffirmed in Simp-
32. 269 Ark. at 483, 602 S.W.2d at 670.
33. Id.
34. Id. A broker's fee is almost universally considered interest if it is exacted
by the lender or an agent of the lender. See Clarke v. Horany, 212 Cal. App. 2d
307, 27 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1963); Speier v. Monnah Park Block Co., 84 So. 2d 697
(Fla. 1955); United Mortgage Co. v. Hildreth, 93 Nev. 79, 559 P.2d 1186 (1977);
Miller v. York, 92 Nev. 226, 548 P.2d 941 (1976); National Am. Life Ins. Co. v.
Bayou Country Club, 16 Utah 2d 417,403 P.2d 26 (1965). See also Modem Pioneers
Ins. Co. v. Nandin, 103 Ariz. 125, 437 P.2d 658 (1968) (50 % of broker's stock own-
ed by lender; broker's fee is interest).
35. See 269 Ark. at 485, 602 S.W.2d at 671 (table of calculations).
36. Id. The concurringjudges agreed, without explanation, that the loans were
usurious. Id. at 486, 602 S.W.2d at 672 (Stroud, J., concurring). They strongly
disapproved, however, of the majority's invalidation of the discounting rule, noting
that the custom clearly was recognized in Arkansas at the time their present con-
stitution was adopted. Id. (Stroud, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 487, 602 S.W.2d at 672 (Stroud, J., concurring). Cf Houchard v.
Berman, 79 Ariz. 381, 290 P.2d 735 (1955) (agreement to pay maximum rate of
interest in advance not usurious); Cobe v. Guyer, 237 Ill. 516, 86 N.E. 1071 (1909)
(same); Johnson v. Groce, 175 S.C. 312, 179 S.E. 39 (1935) (same); Roller v.
Hamilton, 13 Tenn. App. 241 (1931) (same). But cf Buck v. Dahlgren, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 779, 100 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1972) (no interest may lawfully be collected in
advance if lender charges maximum amount of interest allowed).
38. 60 Ark. 288, 30 S.W. 35 (1895) (overruled by Fausett & Co. v. G & P
Real Estate, Inc., 269 Ark. at 484, 602 S.W.2d at 671).
[Vol. 47
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son v. Smith Savings Society,39 which again upheld discounting. 40
Courts that have allowed discounting have done so because it is a tradi-
tional financial practice of the commercial community. The strength of this
custom is sufficient to allow courts to approve an admittedly usurious
transaction. 41 Courts, however, are in a difficult position because the custom
is usurious in a strict mathematical sense. An unequivocal legislative ex-
pression, either allowing or disallowing discounting, would enable courts
to reach a decision on a challenged transaction that is both legally and
mathematically correct. 42
Because discounting can produce a loan that is mathematically usurious,
courts have been reluctant to allow discounting on long-term obligations. 43
For example, in Miller v. First State Bank,44 the lender retained two years'
interest in advance on a three-year loan. The court rejected the bank's con-
tention that this prepayment of interest did not violate the usury statute,
although it recognized that the rule allowing interest in advance at the highest
rate for a year or less was "too firmly established to be departed from. 45
39. 178 Ark. 921, 12 S.W.2d 890 (1929).
40. Accord, Hickingbotham v. Industrial Fin. Corp., 192 Ark. 429, 91 S.W.2d
1023 (1936).
41. E.g., Shropshire v. Commerce Farm Credit Co., 120 Tex. 400, 30 S.W.2d
282 (1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 675 (1931). The Shropshire court stated:
[T]hough logically it is usury to deduct in advance the highest legal
rate of interest on the principal of a loan for any part of the term for which
the principal is borrowed,.. . [this practice has] been validated by the deci-
sions in Texas, as elsewhere in the United States, too long for this court
to now adjudge. . . [it] to be usurious.
120 Tex. at 412, 30 S.W.2d at 286.
42. Georgia's usury statute provides that the lawful rate of interest may not
be exceeded by reserving or discounting the interest, regardless of the type of loan.
GA. CODEANN. 557-101 (Cum. Supp. 1981). SeealsoKentv. Hibernia Sav., Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n, 190 Ga. 764, 10 S.E.2d 759 (1940) (deducting interest in advance
at highest legal rate is usurious, regardless of term of loan). Conversely, Alaska has
a statute that expressly allows money lenders to collect the maximum interest in
advance. See ALASKA STAT. § 45.45.30 (1980).
43. See First Nat'l Bank v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1975) (dis-
counting of short-term single payment notes is long-standing mercantile practice).
See also 45 AM.JUR. 2d Interest and Usury 171 (1969); 91 C.J.S. Usury 34 (1955);
Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 630 (1958).
44. 551 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), modified, 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.
1978).
45. 551 S.W.2d at 97. See also TannerDev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777,
783 (Tex. 1977) (not usurious to collect one year's interest at highest lawful rate
in advance). In Bothwell v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank & Trust Co., 120
Tex. 1, 30 S.W.2d 289 (1930), the court recognized the rule, but pointed out "how
devoid of logic... it was to sanction the collection in advance of interest at the
highest conventional statutory rate, on even short-term loans, under statutes against
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While also recognizing the validity of discounting on one-year obligations,
the court in First National Bank v. Davis4 6 stated:
[W]e regard the toleration of taking interest in advance at the highest
rate allowed by law, as an artificial rule, resting upon long usage
and authority, unsupported by any sound reasoning, and can not
consent to take that artificial rule as the basis of a philosophy by which
a like rule may be extended to cases not within the artificial rule.4 7
The majority in Fausett seems to say that custom cannot legalize a
usurious loan. The court's decision is logically consistent if the effective in-
terest rate determines whether a loan is usurious. It follows that if a 1%
deduction of interest in advance in combination with the interest rate charged
causes the effective yield to exceed the legal maximum, then a deduction
of the entire maximum legal rate in advance that has the same effect is also
usurious. Lending iinstitutions, however, have long relied on the permissibil-
ity of front-end charges and discounting, which are justified by commer-
cial custom that acknowledges both the desirability and convenience of these
practices to borrowers and lenders. Arkansas usury laws have been observed
repeatedly to be strict. 48 Fausett exemplifies this strictness and is important
to any lender that makes loans in Arkansas. Since almost all other jurisdic-
tions have long permitted discounting, 49 however, it is unlikely that Fausett
will acquire a following.
J. BRUCE FARMER
usury." Id. at 5, 30 S.W.2d at 290. Refusing to extend the rule further, the court
stated:
But the question which now confronts the court is whether a rule difficult
to sustain in reason ... which sanctions the advance deduction of interest
at the highest conventional rate on short-term loans ... shall be extend-
ed .... Common sense counsels against extension of a rule not entirely
defensible on principle.
Id. at 7, 30 S.W.2d at 291.
46. 108 Ill. 633 (1884).
47. Id. at 638.
48. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra. See also authorities cited in
note 49 infra.
49. See notes 10 & 42 supra. See also 6 MICHIE ON BANKS AND BANKING Ch.
11, § 33 (1975). Arkansas usury laws have been subject to considerable comment
over the years. For further reading, see Anderson, Usury-Constitutional Interdiction
Applies to Sale of Merchandise on Credit, 12 ARK. L. REV. 202 (1958); Collins & Ham,
The Usury Law of Arkansas: A Study in Evasion, 8 ARK. L. REV. 399 (1954); Jack,
Usuy-Recent Arkansas Developments Analyzed, 21 ARK. L. REV. 224 (1967); Penick,
The Impact of Usury Law on Banks in Arkansas, 8 ARK. L. REV. 420 (1954); Putnam,
Act 330 Discounting of Commercial Papers, 7 ARK. L. REV. 341 (1953).
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